## AFFIRMATIVE

### Perm Do Both

#### Military assistance does not trade off with State Department involvement

Early 11, Lt Col, USAF (Billie, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” *Air War College*, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1018707.pdf>)//BB

When the three indicators of militarization are applied to DOD’s security assistance efforts, results indicate that the United States relies heavily on DOD to pursue foreign policy objectives, but not at the expense of State Department responsibilities. DOD uses security cooperation to build relationships with partner nations and respond to humanitarian efforts, and uses security assistance as a flexible tool to build the capacity of foreign military forces so they can respond to threats in their regions before conditions require a greater US military response. Whenever possible, DOD proactively shapes the global security environment promoting US interests. DOD has the option to use its new Section 1206 authority to respond to urgent and emerging threats based on regional command priorities, or to influence longer-term State Department programs in support of country requirements. Also, DOD’s considerable force presence and commander influence can sway security assistance decisions favorably toward US interests. However, the State Department maintains a high degree of direct involvement and oversight in all security assistance decisions.

#### Close collaboration is good

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

A key aspect of the success of the security cooperation enterprise is the collaboration among and within the Department, most notably DoD’s close collaboration with the State Department ensures that programs are designed and executed with broader national security interests in mind. Internal to the Department of Defense, we recently reorganized – bringing the Defense Security Cooperation Agency under the umbrella of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in the Office of the Secretary of the Defense for Policy to facilitate better collaboration and coordination. Success requires teamwork, and I can assure you that our entire team is focused on embracing it.

### Perm Do CP

#### Security cooperation includes the DOS

MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis, 13 - U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas “SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA589722.pdf>

How we deal with our adversaries is changing in response to these developments in the security environment. How we deal with our international allies and partners also should change. For many years, the term “security cooperation” referred to efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to promote U.S. security interests through the interaction with and development of friendly and allied security capabilities.2 This definition is evolving, however, as illustrated by recent strategic documents and statements by the President and Secretary of Defense.3 The term as used recently includes synchronized efforts by the whole-of-government to build the security capacity of U.S. friends and allies, including the development of economic and political capabilities. The most recent strategic guidance calls for increased emphasis on an interagency and interorganizational approach to building partner capacity and capability, focused on promoting stability and preventing conflict before it begins, all within a framework that emphasizes governance and rule of law. Put another way, recent strategic guidance advocates a whole-of-government approach as the means for translating national security objectives into the outcome of increased partner capacity. This change represents recognition that a wide variety of skill sets is necessary to address these changes in the security environment. Unfortunately, this change presents challenges for current security cooperation practices.

The current structure of security cooperation, that is, the infrastructure of government agencies that participate in security cooperation activities, does not readily support this new guidance. The current security cooperation organization originated in the aftermath of World War II, and continued to evolve through the Cold War. Although the Department of State (DOS) has responsibility for planning and executing security cooperation, the system primarily addresses the military component of security in terms of equipment and training. The DOD, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes these portions of U.S. Security cooperation endeavors, which constitute the preponderance of efforts, both in terms of labor and fund allocation. Furthermore, the DOD’s share has grown considerably in the past five years as Congress significantly increased funding authorities in order to facilitate stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 The key issue, then, is how to shift the emphasis from the Department of Defense to efforts shared among Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies as needed.

#### State controls security cooperation – all DOD SC is carried out through embassies under direct supervision of State

Lieutenant Colonel Toney Filostrat and Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Medina, United States Army, 12 – paper written for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellowship Program (“SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA568436.pdf> **SC = Security Cooperation. SA = Security Assistance. FID = Foreign Internal Defense assistance**

Who Conducts Security Cooperation

The following paragraphs describe the key participants and stakeholders for planning and

managing SC activities at both the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Strategic / National Level

The National Security Council (NSC) generally provides the initial guidance and translation of national-level decisions pertaining to FID, SA, and SC. The Department of State (DoS) is generally the lead government agency for U.S. international affairs. The Secretary of State advises the President in forming foreign policy, including the national FID effort. The DoS assists the NSC in building national FID related policies and priorities, and is the lead government agency to carry out these policies. The DoS Policy Planning Staff, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), and the new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) are the most involved with interagency planning for FID, SA, and SC. The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security is the principal advisor and focal point for SA matters within DoS; control and coordination of SA extends from this office to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. At the national level, the PM is the principal channel of liaison between DoS and DoD. Generally, DoS directs the overall U.S. Government (USG) SA program and DoD executes via SC programs and activities.

DoD Directive 5132.03, Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, dated October 24, 2008, establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities under the GEF, which provides SC guidance to the GCCs, and titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code (USC), and statutory authorities, executive orders, and policies relating to the administration of SC, including SA programs authorized by the FAA and AECA, as amended. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy USD(P) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all SC matters. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs) establishes SA policy and supervises SA programs through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Secretaries of the Military Departments (MILDEPs) coordinate on SC policy guidance, campaign plans, and allocate resources to achieve SC objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides implementation guidance for U.S. military plans and programs and provides the Secretary of Defense with military advice concerning SC.15

Operational and Tactical Level

The Director, DSCA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), directs,

administers, and provides DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives

to U.S. missions, for the execution of DoD SC programs for which DSCA has responsibility.

Other security SC programs are managed by other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the

GCCs, or MILDEPs. Specifically, GCCs develop campaign plans to conduct SC programs and

activities in accordance with the GEF, and complete campaign plan and campaign support plan

assessments.16

The U.S. diplomatic mission to a host nation includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically present in a country. The President gives the Chief of Mission (COM), normally an ambassador, full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG executive branch employees in country. The COM has authority over all USG executive branch employees within the mission and host country except for employees under the command of a U.S. military commander (Title 22, USC, Section 3927).17 The Senior Defense Official (SDO) or Defense Attaché (DATT) is the principal DoD official in a U.S. embassy, as designated by the Secretary of Defense. The SDO or DATT is the COM’s principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD military officer assigned to a diplomatic mission, and the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving the embassy or DoD elements assigned to or working from the embassy. In addition to being the diplomatically accredited DATT, the SDO is the chief of the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) within the Country Team. The SCO includes all DoD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SA and SC management functions under titles 22 and 10 USC. SCOs typically include military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance/cooperation functions.18

#### Substantial security cooperation is funded and controlled by State

Lieutenant Colonel Toney Filostrat and Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Medina, United States Army, 12 – paper written for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellowship Program (“SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA568436.pdf> **SC = Security Cooperation. SA = Security Assistance. FID = Foreign Internal Defense assistance**

Significant portions of U.S. military security cooperation are funded as foreign assistance activities managed by the Department of State, and appropriated by Congress. With the amount of funding in the Defense appropriations bills, it’s not common knowledge that these military programs are funded under DoS budget authorities. The State Department has always taken its lead role on foreign assistance seriously, as a significant foreign policy tool. Over the past ten years, DoS focused on substantial internal reforms including foreign assistance planning and implementation. The U.S. government struggles to prepare for a future of persistent conflict and budget constraints. It is important to solidify reforms and institutionalize the integrating actions planned in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the 3D Planning Framework to implement effective and efficient foreign assistance activities.

### No Solvency---Top-Shelf

#### The Department of State is structurally inept and incapable at effective diplomacy

Zeya and Finer 20, \*American diplomat who has served as the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Biden Administration since July 2021, \*\*American journalist and diplomat who serves as Deputy National Security Advisor under National Security Advisor (Uzra and Jon, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” *Council Special Report* No. 89)//BB

It has become an article of faith among policymakers that principled American leadership has waned but remains in demand around the world. Moreover, America’s network of international relationships is its foremost strategic asset, even as the agency charged with advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy—the Department of State (DOS)— has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis. However, there is a third framing assumption: that the current crisis offers an opportunity to address this predicament and revitalize American diplomacy. Despite the decades-long failure to implement essential reforms—and even in the face of sustained hostility from the current administration—diplomacy remains the best tool the United States has to advance its foreign policy interests. The role of the State Department has received heightened attention amid the onslaught it has suffered under the Donald J. Trump administration, which has treated American diplomats and diplomacy with a mix of neglect and disdain. But many of the challenges facing the DOS have existed for decades. Deficits in diversity, institutional culture, and professionalization are endemic to the State Department as an institution, and a diminished policy role for career officials persisted under previous administrations. Too often, leaders from both major parties have taken public support for U.S. leadership in the world for granted without making a strong enough case to the American public for why it is essential. Concrete steps can, and should, be taken solely through executive action in the first year of an administration committed to revitalizing American diplomacy, with thought to cementing change through legislation. The most pressing challenges facing the State Department include a twenty-first-century policy environment that has, in some priority areas, evolved beyond the core competencies of most Foreign and Civil Service officers and an institution hollowed out by three years of talent flight, mired in excessively layered structure, and resistant to reform. Perhaps most important, they include the multigenerational challenge of a diplomatic workforce that falls woefully short of reflecting the diverse country it serves, particularly at the senior-most ranks, compromising its effectiveness and fostering a homogeneous and risk-averse culture that drives out rather than cultivates fresh perspectives. The State Department today risks losing the “war for talent,” not only to the private sector but increasingly to other government agencies, due to inflexible career tracks, self-defeating hiring constraints, and a lack of commitment to training and professional development. Finally, DOS is hampered by Congress’s failure over many years to pass authorizing legislation, leading to budgetary pressures and diminishing DOS’s status in the hierarchy of national security agencies rather than reinforcing the nation’s paramount foreign policy institution.

### No Solvency---Risk Aversion/Resources

#### Benghazi created excessive risk aversion

Hartig 21, Executive Editor of Just Security. He is also Executive Director of National Journal's Network Science Initiative and Fellow, International Security Program at New America. Former Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council, former Deputy Director for Counterterrorism Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Luke, “Letting Diplomacy Lead US Counterterrorism: What Would That Look Like?,” Just Security, <https://www.justsecurity.org/75046/letting-diplomacy-lead-us-counterterrorism-what-would-that-look-like/)//BB>

But State Department management – and the broader U.S. government leadership – has at times struggled with how to effectively manage risk. Much of this is because of the highly politicized environment the department found itself in after the September 2012 Benghazi attack in Libya. To be sure, Benghazi exposed shortcomings, particularly in how the State Department’s security professionals plugged into policy discussions. But it also spurred much-needed changes to how the department trains its personnel and evaluates risks overseas. Yet, as Republicans used the attacks to launch escalating political attacks, the U.S. government seemed to retreat into a bunker mentality.

#### That, combined with understaffing, decimates solvency

David, Acosta and Krohley 21, Colonel Arnel P. David is a US Army strategist assigned to the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. First Sergeant Sean A. Acosta is a civil affairs noncommissioned officer, and was the US Army’s 2018 NCO of the year. Dr. Nicholas Krohley is the principal of FrontLine Advisory. (“GETTING COMPETITION WRONG: THE US MILITARY’S LOOMING FAILURE,” *Modern War Institute*, <https://mwi.usma.edu/getting-competition-wrong-the-us-militarys-looming-failure/>)//BB

At present, we are engaged in global competition with China (and, to a much lesser extent, Russia). We are engaged in a regional contest with Iran. Global jihadist networks remain a potent threat. That said, we do ourselves a devastating disservice when we approach the rest of the world on the basis of its utility in these contests. American policy in Ukraine is downstream of our rivalry with Russia. The same is true for our engagement in Iraq with respect to Iran, and across much of the Global South vis-à-vis China. We instrumentalize bilateral relationships with smaller powers in pursuit of advantage against our rivals, while neglecting the local details that define the strategic landscape. This instrumentalization is readily apparent to those on the receiving end, provoking cynicism and frustration from Kyiv to Baghdad and beyond. Ultimately, it is exploitative and self-defeating—just as it was during the Cold War, when this same mentality led us to disaster from Vietnam to Nicaragua. The new great game will be won or lost based, above all else, on contextual understanding, partnerships, and alliances. It is not America’s responsibility to solve intractable problems in distant lands. However, we absolutely must understand said problems (as we have demonstrably failed to do over the past twenty years), so that we might manage our entanglements and the expenditure of finite resources. Across much of the globe, this task falls to the US military. The Department of State is understaffed, and isolated from ground truth by crippling risk aversion. The intelligence community’s priorities lie elsewhere. From sub-Saharan Africa to the South China Sea, the military is often our principal point of contact with contested terrain.

#### The military doesn’t suffer from the same resource shortages that the State Department does

Serafino 8, Coordinator and International Affairs Specialist at CRS (Nina, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA493001.pdf>)//BB

In addition to its regional advantage, DOD enjoys two other advantages: greater planning and execution capabilities, and substantially greater budgetary resources. DOD can muster more [hu]manpower than any other agency. While U.S. military personnel may be stretched in wartime, there still exist substantial reserves of personnel that can be tapped to plan and carry out activities. The combatant commands enjoy considerably more personnel than do individual embassies, and their personnel are oriented toward planning activities, whereas State Department personnel are oriented toward collecting information and furthering U.S. policy through diplomacy, such as person-to-person contact. Despite waging a war in Iraq, CENTCOM created a new Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJT-HOA) of roughly 2,000 U.S. military personnel (the number fluctuates regularly) to plan and carry out efforts in the Horn of Africa that include much foreign assistance activity. In Iraq, DOD temporarily provided military personnel to fill about 100 State Department PRT posts, until the State Department could contract persons with the needed expertise to fill them.

### No Solvency---Political Backlash

#### Diplomatic assistance causes political backlash---that wrecks solvency

Kralev 20, Executive Director @ WIDA, The Washington International Diplomatic Academy (WIDA) is an independent organization that provides practical professional training in diplomacy and international affairs — both in person and online — to students, recent graduates and professionals in government, NGOs and the private sector (Nicholas, “Why Politicians Don’t Trust Diplomats,” Washington International Diplomatic Academy, <https://diplomaticacademy.us/2020/06/14/kralev-why-politicians-dont-trust-diplomats/)//BB>

So politicians’ lack of trust in the Foreign Service is based on perceptions that are largely divorced from reality. Like most Americans, they know very little about our diplomats. In a challenge to such a conclusion, previous administrations have often pointed to entrusting a few senior Foreign Service officers, including William J. Burns and Thomas R. Pickering, with top State Department posts as an example of the respective president’s reliance on professionals. That may speak of these officers’ capabilities, but it doesn’t make up for sidelining or ignoring the service as an institution. At least Bush and Obama understood that having held a prominent position under an administration of the other party is also a part of a career diplomat’s job. For example, Bush appointed R. Nicholas Burns ambassador to NATO and later undersecretary of state, even though Burns had been State Department spokesman under Clinton. And Obama appointed Victoria Nuland an assistant secretary of state despite her earlier role as a close adviser to Dick Cheney, Bush’s vice president. In contrast, Trump has retaliated against officers who held key positions during the Obama administration. Politicians’ decades-long distrust of the Foreign Service has significantly undermined the authority of the professionals and ultimately weakened U.S. diplomacy globally. The very real danger that there won’t be enough properly trained diplomats to restore America’s clout in the future worries us at the independent Washington International Diplomatic Academy. So much so that, although we were set up to offer short-term courses, we’ve decided to start a one-year post-graduate practical training program for people who aspire to become diplomats — the first such effort outside government. Our instructors, all former senior Foreign Service officers, have a lot to teach.

### No Solvency---Trust

#### Military-to-military contacts are necessary to build trust and avoid miscalculation

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/)//BB>

Within the main elements of national power (diplomacy, informational, military, and economic, or DIME), the military is often considered the last resort. However, the U.S. military has been a key player in, for instance, the spread of democracy, building partner countries’ strength through military-to-military relationships (including in the form of bi- and trilateral exercises to support standing Operation Plans, NATO, the United Nations, and Theater Security Cooperation), personnel exchange, and humanitarian assistance operations. Through these efforts, among others, the U.S. military helps to carry out the diplomatic mission of the United States (military diplomacy paved the way for NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, for instance). When military units participate in bilateral or multilateral exercises with other countries, for example, the purpose is several-fold: The interaction increases interoperability between the militaries, provides for cultural exchange and understanding, and offers an opportunity to expand each nation’s capabilities while exercising potential contingencies. The importance of military diplomacy in foreign engagement is to build dialogue that may facilitate further communication and, during a crisis, avoid confusion between cultures.

#### The DoD is best for improving strong relationships with host countries

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

Our relationships provide us with a reservoir of strength. They allow us to operate by, with, and through our allies and partners to meet shared security challenges. The degree of partnership should not be measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but rather by their quality. The Department of Defense has learned from large-scale assistance programs that for lasting impact, a comprehensive engagement plan involves more than training and equipping. Importantly, we are building a culture of learning and adaptation, drawing on lessons from program successes, as well as, from programs that did not have the desired impact. We are building a learning agenda and integrating it into decision processes, and measure program impact in a way that assesses real change, rather than counting our own inputs into programs as successes in themselves. We seek to learn lessons and avoid the fallacy of sunk costs by ruthlessly prioritizing programs that are strategic, and setting appropriate expectations for programs that provide more of a tactical advantage. Through this approach, we can unlock the comparative advantages our allies and partners bring as we collectively work together to meet our shared objectives.

#### Military diplomacy builds trust and relations

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/>)//BB

Moreover, in places where the U.S. military has maintained a long-term presence (e.g. Japan, South Korea, Germany), we see that military interoperability enhances regions economically—directly through commercial contracting and the resulting employment, servicemember contributions through commerce, and in some cases, contributions of military gear and equipment through foreign military sales or otherwise. The resulting “military diplomacy,” also referred to as “defense diplomacy,” “soft power,” “military public diplomacy,” and “strategic communication,” allows the military to have a direct impact on foreign policy through other means. Although not diplomacy in the traditional sense of a State Department mission, military relationships between countries build a foundation on which further connections between nations are developed.

### No Solvency---AT Bergmann

#### State Department assistance fails

Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” *The Heritage Foundation*, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-shift-security-cooperation-state-department)//BB>

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department. That would be a big mistake, because it would minimize the Pentagon’s role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program’s military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are not the values by which such security assistance programs should be solely judged. Security sector assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, these programs should prioritize national security. To this end, reforms should enhance joint State and Defense authorities so programs are evaluated in terms of America’s national strategic goals.

#### Even Bergmann admits structural reforms in the DoS would be necessary for solvency

1NC Bergmann and Schmitt 21, \*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, \*\*senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” *Center for American Progress*, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)//BB

Moreover, due to personnel and resource shortages, former U.S. officials found that the State Department is “not equipped to coordinate across the increasingly complex and unwieldy” security assistance system.80 Senior policymakers, who often lack adequate staff or extensive training on security assistance, are not well equipped to effectively guide the bureaucracy on who should receive security assistance and how it fits into broader foreign policy decision-making.81 The State Department’s lack of resources also naturally hampers dual-key provisions that seek to fix coordination gaps between the State Department and the DOD. This leads to a system where security assistance policy varies country by country, depending on the personnel in place and the agency that takes charge. The added bureaucracy can make efficient, cost-conscious decisions impossible, and it opens the process up to political influence.

### AT HR Solvency Deficit

#### The Department of Defense uses Security Cooperation to protect and promote human rights

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

We continue to invest in the professionalization of our security cooperation workforce by requiring increasingly rigorous training. We are investing in the concept of institutionalizing the defense diplomacy role the Department’s representatives in embassies play, ensuring that the partnerships they promote are consistent with our national security interests and values. What ultimately sets apart the United States in an environment of strategic competition are the values we represent. Our ability to maintain and continue to set a high bar for human rights, humanitarian affairs, and rule of law—including our civilian oversight of the military—is a critical tool we can leverage to help our partners meet their goals and advance those shared values. Doing so is both a moral and strategic imperative. We also take our responsibility in the humanitarian sector very seriously, as we play an important supporting role in the interagency in supporting civil authorities in countries facing crises. Whether it is managing crisis response capacity building under the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account, employing Foreign Disaster Relief, or maintaining Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), the Department is committed to supporting our partners’ efforts to provide humanitarian services to their civilian populace. During our recent reorganization within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), we have merged the offices of Stability and Humanitarian Affairs and Security Cooperation to form a new Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships. This shift deliberately integrated humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and human rights with the existing processes related to security cooperation to emphasize the centrality of these areas of defense cooperation that benefit allies and partners in need. Women, Peace and Security; civilian protection; and respect for the rule of law also fall into this issue set. This integration will help us look more holistically at the needs and challenges our partners and their diverse populations face, particularly when those needs can spiral into crises that spill outside the country’s borders.

### AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Non-Unique

#### The military already controls the vast majority of US foreign policy

Quainton 17, Distinguished Diplomat in Residence at American University (Anthony, “Militarization and Marginalization of American Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,” American Diplomacy, <https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2018/03/militarization-and-marginalization-of-american-diplomacy-and-foreign-policy/)//BB>

The issue of militarization of foreign policy is a common theme. One of the New York Times 100 notable books of 2016 was Rosa Brooks How Everything became War and the Military Became Everything. In the spring of 2016 Georgetown University Press published a collection of essays entitled Mission Creep designed to explore the Militarization of US Foreign Policy. As far back as 2003 Dana Priest, a journalist for the Washington Post, wrote a book entitled The Mission which asserted that American diplomacy was being outgunned by the military and that the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on the military to manage its role in world affairs. She claimed that “on (president Bill) Clinton’s watch the military slowly, without public scrutiny or debate came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and influence around the world”. Specifically she identified the regional combatant commanders. (In Europe the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR) as sources of increasing diplomatic influence. In the introduction to her book she assets that “U.S. leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic.” This shift she argues “has been going on for more than a decade without much public discussion or debate.” Ms. Priest describes a world in which four star generals and admirals fly around the world in large jet aircraft, accompanied by substantial staffs to engage in diplomatic contacts not just with ministers of defense and force commanders but with heads of state and government as well. She asserts that they were eclipsing the role of hapless Ambassadors who lacked both resources and access.

### AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Military Solves

#### Military diplomacy promotes soft power

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/)//BB>

Since military people know better than anyone the true cost of waging war, the U.S. military has a vested interest in working to build capabilities and partnerships to maintain worldwide peace and stability. Although the lines between what are doctrinally military or diplomatic missions may blur, it is to the advantage of both the State Department and the military to capitalize on any opportunity to advance the policy and security of the United States. The military, known as a hard-power tool, can also be used as a soft-power one. Military members serving overseas in any capacity are already often the forefront of American diplomacy, moving their mission set beyond traditional warfighting to an extended role in support of the National Security Strategy of the United States, with great success. The fact that China is increasingly involved in regions like Africa and Latin America—giving Beijing influence there—is further reason for the United States to take a more active approach and mitigate vulnerabilities. China has learned from our greatest strategic achievement, the Marshall Plan, and has formulated a long-term strategy to, among other things, undermine U.S. influence. We need a coordinated, long-term plan of military diplomacy and economic support in response.

### AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Militarization Good

#### Military-first should be the objective for all security assistance

Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” The Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-shift-security-cooperation-state-department)//BB>

Another report published this month by the Center for a New American Security rightly suggests that security assistance in the Middle East should be guided by strategy and applied narrowly to military effects. However, the report’s recommendations are limited to counterterrorism activities and a strategy of deprioritizing the Middle East in favor of the Indo-Pacific. If limiting security assistance to military purposes would make programs more effective in a region of waning emphasis, it stands to reason that this should be the formative basis for all security assistance programs, especially when strategy calls for increased investment in the security capacities of partner nations. Reforms to security assistance should push the agencies in this direction, encouraging—or compelling—State to design its programs in closer coordination with the Pentagon and in support of Defense Department’s operational needs, such as improving military forward presence, wartime resilience and interoperability.

#### Militarized foreign policy leads to global peace

Reveron 15, chair of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval War College and is a faculty affiliate at the Belfer Center (Derek, “Security Cooperation: A Key Pillar of Defense Policy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2015/11/security-cooperation-a-key-pillar-of-defense-policy/)//>BB

As the United States looks ahead, the country is sure to follow the tradition in defense strategy that prioritizes enabling partners through training and equipping their forces. Over the last 15 years, the number of status of forces agreements (SOFAs) increased from 40 to 117. This is due, in part, to the fact that while administrations may change, fundamental U.S. interests have not. These include: protecting the US homeland from catastrophic attack, sustaining a global system marked by open lines of communication to facilitate commerce, promoting international security, and preventing powers hostile to the United States from being able to dominate important areas of the world.[4] The United States aspires to create true partners who can confront their own threats to internal stability, which organized crime, violent actors, and regional rivals exploit. Known as the “indirect approach,” the U.S. helps countries fill security deficits that exist when a country cannot independently protect its own national security. American generosity helps explain this, but U.S. national security benefits too. For example, by providing radars and surveillance technology, Central American countries can control their airspace and can interdict drug-filled planes bound for the US; by providing logistic support, Pakistan can lead a maritime coalition promoting maritime security in the Indian Ocean; and by selling AEGIS destroyers, Japan can counter North Korean missiles and provide early warning of missile threats to the United States. Through security cooperation programs like these, the United States helps other countries meet their immediate national security needs, but there is also an effort to foster independence so states can contribute to global security. This is most visible in a program such as the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative that trains and equips foreign militaries to participate in peacekeeping operations. While the United States does not want to deploy ground forces under the United Nations flag, it does play a key role in peacekeeping by training and equipping over 250,000 peacekeepers since 2005. Programs like GPOI enabled Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda to participate in an African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. An officer from Chad seemed to capture the rationale for other countries’ efforts to contribute to global security: “When your neighbor’s house is burning, you have to put it out, because if not, yours is next.”[5] U.S. security cooperation often provides the tools countries need when their national security demands exceed their security capacities.

#### Militarized foreign policy solves a variety of non-military threats

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The preventive and cooperative approach to foreign policy is visible in today’s military, which has undergone dramatic change over the last three decades. Defense strategy embraces the notion that the U.S. military does much more than fight wars. The military trains, equips, and deploys peacekeepers; provides humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and supports other militaries to reduce security deficits throughout the world. With national security focused on weak states and regional challengers, the U.S. military has been evolving from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. The rationale for security cooperation has been based on the assumption that instability breeds chaos, which would make it more likely that the US or the international community would face pressure to intervene in the future. Given America’s global foreign policy, many countries have large expectations for assistance from the United States, but the US also derives benefits from security cooperation. Among these are: Obtaining base access as a quid pro quo Augmenting U.S. force structure by providing logistics and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to coalition partners in the Middle East Promoting a favorable balance of power by selling weapon systems and training programs to Gulf Cooperation Council countries to balance Iran Harmonizing areas of cooperation by working with Japan and Israel on missile defense Promoting self-defense through the Georgia Train and Equip program Reinforcing sovereignty through programs like Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative with Mexico Supporting the US industrial base and creating interoperable air forces through the F-35 program As these reasons suggest, security cooperation is much bigger than train and equip forces in combat zones. Given the scope of these programs and diversity of the partners, one can develop measurable objectives. These include: the strength of regional security agreements, the types of regional cooperation (e.g., participation in U.S.-led air, maritime, or land operations), willingness of foreign governments to counter threats the U.S. identifies (e.g. terrorism), and the relative receptivity of U.S. forces within the partner country. Internal to countries, one can measure how well partners combat security challenges, the strength of civil–military relations, and the levels of respect for human rights. Measurement can include the extent to which international commerce flows freely, levels of cooperation between military and international relief organizations, and support for international initiatives to combat disease, illicit activity, and weapons proliferation.

### AT Democracy Impact

#### Democracy’s net less peaceful---they have no advantage over autocracies but have a propensity to go to war with autocracies.

Bakker ’17 (Femke; is an assistant professor at the Institute of Political Science @ University of Leiden; *Do liberal norms matter? A cross-regime experimental investigation of the normative explanation of the democratic peace in China and the Netherlands*; [https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/74424/Bakker\_2017.pdf?sequence=1](about:blank); accessed 7/21/19; MSCOTT)

Concluding discussion

Democratic peace theory posits that individuals of liberal-democracies are socialized with liberal norms that nurture a peaceful attitude towards other democracies. Furthermore, it postulates that individuals in autocracies lack this socialization process and will consequently be more war prone towards all regime-types. Previous studies into this mechanism at microlevel found that democratic individuals are indeed more peaceful towards democracies during an interstate conflict. However, these studies have focused their research on democratic individuals only, and moreover have assumed the presence of liberal norms rather than measuring these. This research extends to those studies by measuring the level of liberal norms among democratic and autocratic individuals and compare the effect these norms have on the support for war within an experimental setting.

Indeed, the democratic experimental group showed to be more peaceful towards other democracies, just like previous studies showed. However, the comparative perspective brought a new insight: because the autocratic citizens were overall more peaceful towards all regime-types the comparison showed that actually the democratic participants were not more peaceful towards other democracies, but rather more war-prone towards autocracies. These 22 findings are important in the light of theoretical refinement, and show that we cannot simply assume autocratic individuals to be war prone, as democratic peace theory does (Maoz and Russett 1993, Russett 1993, p.35, Weart 1998, pp.81-83, Rousseau 2005, pp.27-28).

Secondly, the measuring of liberal norms showed that also autocratic individuals posses a level of liberal norms. The average of the autocratic group was indeed significantly lower than the democratic group, but the difference was small and had a small effect size. Most important contribution of this measurement is that liberal norms cannot be assumed to be absent within autocracies, as democratic peace theory does. Moreover, liberal norms showed to have only an effect within the democratic group: those with a higher level of liberal norms were more inclined to attack an autocracy over a democracy. Within the autocratic group, the level of liberal norms did not have any influence on the support for war.

These results show how important it is to indeed measure liberal norms and not simply assume these to be present or absent. Furthermore, these finding raise many questions that further research might be inspired by. If these results would hold when the experiment would be replicated for different samples of democratic and autocratic individuals, in other words: if democratic individuals show in new studies also to be triggered by autocracy to become more war prone, in particular when they endorse liberal norms more highly, we might have found more evidence for the argument that Western political rhetoric has molded democratic peace theory into a self-fulfilling prophecy, as was argued by several authors (Ish-Shalom 2006, Risse-Kappen 1995, Houghton 2007, Houghton 2009).

Another important extension to earlier studies is that this research has controlled for the threat of the conflict, after all, if a threat is not perceived as severe, why would anyone want to attack any other country? The results of that test showed actually more variance than initially anticipated, in other words: it had to be considered within the analyses of the data. Because a test showed that there was no relation between the perception of threat and the treatment of regime-type, perception of threat was taken into consideration as an independent variable. And threat matters, strongly. Within a multivariate test of all theorized indicators, perception of threat shows to be the most important indicator why democratic and autocratic individuals alike support war. It was actually so strong that the effect of regime-type and liberal norms that showed in the descriptive results, was faded out.

### AT Hegemony Impact

#### No leadership impact.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", *A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security*, <https://www.cato.org/publications/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy>)

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

Overall, proponents of the stabilizing power of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most basic observations from cognitive psychology: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we perceive them to be.44 The so‐​called egocentric bias, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. Washington is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.

The indispensability fallacy owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the reflected glory of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been exceptional in their exceptionalism.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world.

Americans have always combined that feeling of divine providence with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and battle evil wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46

Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average.

Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to enforce peace. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are correct, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to reverse. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (economic development, complex interdependence, nuclear weapons, international institutions, democracy, shifting global norms on war) seem poised to disappear any time soon.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.

#### Heg is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.

Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.

The American electorate has turned sharply inward in response to military overreach in the Middle East, the economic dislocations brought about by innovation and globalization, and the national calamity caused by COVID-19. The nation’s next president would be wise to take note—and craft a brand of global statecraft that is effective but also politically sustainable. Otherwise, the strategic pullback that needs to take place will occur by default rather than by design, risking that U.S. overreach could turn into even more dangerous underreach. Indeed, that’s what’s been happening during Trump’s presidency. He seems to have understood the need to retrench. But his troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Germany have been haphazard, making a hash of the effort. Retrenchment cannot be done by tweet, in unpredictable fits and starts, and couched in an abrasive “America first” unilateralism that has alienated allies and set the world on edge.

Democratic candidate Joe Biden is far better suited to restore an equilibrium between the nation’s foreign policy and its political will. Throughout his career, he has been a pragmatic and prudent internationalist; looking forward, pragmatism and prudence will require a more selective and discriminating internationalism, not restoration of the status quo ante. Three-quarters of the American public want U.S. troops to leave Afghanistan and Iraq—it is time to downsize the U.S. footprint in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy has become over-militarized—the next administration should reallocate priorities and resources, putting more emphasis on diplomacy, cybersecurity, global public health, and climate change. Washington should also return to being a team player if it is to lighten its load; retrenchment and multilateral engagement go hand in hand. Meeting the threat posed by China, managing international trade and finance, preventing nuclear proliferation, addressing pandemics—these and other urgent challenges all require broad international cooperation. And as the United States pulls back from its role as global policeman, it will want like-minded partners to help fill the gap. These partnerships become stronger through diplomacy and teamwork.

The top priorities of the next president will be at home: taming the pandemic, repairing the economy, and reviving democratic institutions and norms. Only if the country’s democratic lights come back on can it effectively deal with the rest of the world. In the meantime, the next administration needs to continue Trump’s effort to downsize the nation’s foreign entanglements—but in a smart and measured way. The United States needs to step back without stepping away. “Build back better” applies abroad just as much as it does at home.